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THOMAS BRACKETT REED
“Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed: American Statesman.’'
1896 photograph by Parker, Washington, D. C. published in Samuel W. McCall, 
The Life of Thomas Brackett Reed 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin 8c Co., 1914), frontispiece.
THOMAS BRACKETT REED, CIVIL 
RIGHTS, AND THE FIGHT FOR 
FAIR ELECTIONS
BY WENDY HAZARD
Few causes in American history have proved more enduring than 
the effort to ensure all citizens the right to vote. From the enfranchis­
ing o f  African-Americans after the Civil War to the granting o f  
womens suffrage and the passage o f the Voting Rights Act in 1965, 
the country has struggled to live up to its image as the guardian o f  
the ideal that every citizen has a guaranteed right to vote. The pro­
longed presidential election o f2000 and the vote-counting debacle in 
Florida once again focused national attention on the issue o f enfran­
chisement. Democrats argued that the Florida election, whether by 
accident or design, was hopelessly flawed. The NAACP and other 
civil rights organizations produced evidence o f confusing ballots, 
scrubbed voter lists, and lost registration forms, all o f  which, they be­
lieve, conspired to deny African-Americans and other minorities 
their voting rights. Calls for federal action and electoral reform have 
reverberated through the halls o f Congress ever since.
The arguments o f reformers today resonate with the language 
and concerns o f an earlier time. In 1889-1890, advocates o f electoral 
reform, most o f whom were then Republicans, made a valiant, but 
ultimately abortive, effort to protect the voting rights o f African- 
Americans in southern states. At a time when southern redeemers 
were seeking to obliterate the memory o f Reconstruction and deny 
blacks any role in the political life o f  the South, the leadership o f the 
Republican party was determined to strengthen the federal govern­
ment's role in protecting the rights o f  its citizens.
Maine Congressman and Speaker o f  the House Thomas Brackett 
Reed presided over this burst o f congressional energy for electoral re­
form and black suffrage. This paper traces Speaker Reed’s commit­
ment to that effort, and examines the formidable skills he brought to 
bear to win passage o f a federal elections bill in the House o f Repre­
sentatives in 1890. The bill was ultimately defeated in the Senate— a 
watershed moment that signaled the end o f the Republican party’s 
and northern politicians’ concern for issues that had dominated na­
tional politics since the end o f the Civil War. It was to be the last sus­
tained effort to protect African-Americans’ voting rights until the 
Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, the march on Selma, and the
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passage o f the Voting Rights Act o f 1965. Reed's efforts throughout 
the long and highly charged debate between 1889 and 1890 rank 
among the greatest o f his long and extraordinary career.
Wendy Hazard is an assistant professor o f history at the Univer­
sity o f Maine, Augusta where she specializes in twentieth-century 
American political history.
W HEN THE Fifty-first Congress opened in December 1889, the Republican party was in a position for the first time in fourteen years to set the national agenda. When the votes of 
the election of November 1888 were counted, Republicans had won con­
trol of both the Congress and the presidency, and had broken a party 
deadlock that had stifled legislative action for years. But the margin of 
victory had been razor-thin. The new president, Benjamin Harrison, had 
lost the popular vote to Grover Cleveland, but won his election in the 
electoral college by a vote that hung on returns from his home state of 
Indiana. Republicans in the House held a slim eight-vote majority, 
barely enough to allow them to constitute a quorum.1
Republican leaders were understandably eager to use their advan­
tage, slim as it was, to take firm control of the legislative process early in 
the session, and pass laws that would further their party's agenda and in­
crease its strength in coming elections. They had campaigned for fiscal 
and tariff reforms, and were determined to enact legislation that they 
believed would strengthen the economy and protect the nation s indus­
tries and farms from foreign competition. Of equal importance to the 
party’s leadership was the enactment of civil rights legislation to protect 
the rights of African-American voters and ensure fair elections in the 
South. These were moral concerns that had been at the heart of Republi­
can politics since the party’s inception. But by this time, they were polit­
ical concerns as well. Republicans were convinced that violence, voter in­
timidation, and systematic fraud had been responsible for Republican 
losses in the deep South since the end of Reconstruction.
A Senate investigation of disturbances in the 1886 congressional 
elections in Washington County, Texas, revealed the lynching of blacks 
and the forced expulsion of three white Republicans from the state.2 
Elaborate extra-legal devices aimed at disenfranchising African-Ameri­
can voters loyal to the Republican party were also widespread. They in­
cluded the stuffing of ballot boxes, tampering with returns, doctoring 
registration rolls, changing polling places without prior notification, and 
locating the polls miles from where African-Americans lived.3 All these
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methods had conspired successfully to consign a virtually solid South to 
the Democratic party Republicans were determined to find the means 
to end these methods and to reassert their party’s viability in the South.
President Harrison signaled his party’s rekindled concern for fair 
elections and the rights of African-American voters in his inaugural ad­
dress. “The freedom of the ballot is a condition of our national life, and 
no power invested in the Congress or in the Executive to secure or per­
petuate it should remain unused upon occasion.”4 In his first annual 
message to Congress in 1899, Harrison spoke of the “disgrace” that sul­
lied the reputation of the entire nation. “Colored people had by various 
devices been deprived of any effective exercise of their civil rights,” he 
said. He called on Congress to enact “such measures within its well-de­
fined constitutional powers as will secure to all people a free exercise of 
suffrage and every other civil right under the Constitution and laws of 
the United States.”5 Democrats had reason to be concerned. Republicans 
knew that the success of their legislative agenda in the Fifty-first Con­
gress would depend on the firmness and determination of the new 
Speaker of the House. In Thomas Brackett Reed of Maine they had their 
man. A fiercely partisan Republican, a brilliant debater, and a man of 
formidable intellect, Reed had earned his colleagues’ esteem for his mas­
tery of legislative tactics and parliamentary procedure. The Republican 
caucus elected him Speaker when Congress opened in December, con­
vinced that he would provide the party with strong leadership. “The 
danger in a free country,” Reed told a Philadelphia audience shortly after 
his election, “is not that power will be exercised too freely, but that it will 
be exercised too sparingly”6 He was clearly eager for the job, ready to 
tackle head-on any Democratic efforts to obstruct the Republican 
agenda, and confident that he could bring discipline to the legislative 
process.
In 1889, Reed was fifty years old. He had entered Congress in 1877, 
and since that time had perfected his knowledge of the intricacies of 
House procedure and parliamentary device. Henry Cabot Lodge, who 
served with Reed for seven years in the House, and who had campaigned 
for his election, said of him, “In my professional opinion, there has never 
been a more perfectly equipped leader in any parliamentary body at any 
time.” 7 At 6 feet 3 inches tall, and nearly 300 pounds, Reed made an un­
forgettable visual impression that inspired both fear and respect in his 
fellow politicians. “A stupendous figure— indeed Brobdingnagian . . . 
and ambitious as Lucifer,” said Champ Clark. A “human frigate among 
shallops,” said another.8 Reed’s sarcastic wit was also legendary and he
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was never reluctant to use it. Democrats were his favorite target. When 
one Democratic orator completed a particularly long-winded speech in 
which he grandly stated that he would rather be right than president, 
Reed retorted, “The gentleman need not be disturbed. He will never be 
either/' Of another, he remarked, “The gentleman never rises to speak 
without subtracting from the total sum of human knowledge." The De­
mocratic party, he said, was but a “hopeless assortment of discord and 
differences, as incapable of positive action as it is capable of infinite 
clamor." By contrast, the Republicans were poised to become the great 
party of the future. “Progress is the essence of Republicanism. To have 
met the great emergencies as they arose has been our history. To meet 
emergencies as they shall arise must be our daily walk and duty, or we 
shall cease to be."9
On a number of key issues, Reed was a down-the-line conservative 
New England Republican. He dismissed the Greenback, Populist, and 
Democratic planks on currency as dangerously inflationary. He sup­
ported high protective tariffs as the “solution to the ills of society," and 
the best way to protect American workers against foreign competition. 
And he embraced a laissez-faire attitude toward the trusts, assailing ac­
tions to curtail them as counterproductive, comparing them to “a bear 
who tried to kill a fly with a stone and ended up killing his friend in­
stead.” 10 Reed was also no friend of organized labor. Ralph Beaumont, 
chairman of the Congressional Legislative Committee of the Knights of 
Labor, who campaigned in Maine against Reed's reelection in 1886, said 
of Reed, “he is corporation every time . . .  there isn't a man in the United 
States whose election would be so dangerous to the labor cause."11
Reed Champions Federal Control o f Elections
White southerners, wary of Republican talk of new laws that threat­
ened federal oversight of their elections, hoped that Reed’s ties to north­
ern industrialists and his advocacy for a strong protective tariff would 
keep Reed from launching “a new crusade against the South." J. L. M. 
Curry of Alabama hoped that “the fact that Northern men, mainly Re­
publicans, own our Railroads in the South and are largely invested in 
manufacturing and mining may save us from Negro rule. Their pecu­
niary interest may make them conservative."12 Senator John Tyler Mor­
gan of Alabama agreed with Curry and predicted that “we will get away 
without a fusillade on the Negro question---- [P]rotectionists want mar­
Thomas Brackett Reed 5
kets, and the silver men want free coinage, and these and other craving 
people want the help of the South against their own people, and they 
prefer to leave the Negro to work out his own salvation, rather than lose 
money. Money, my dear friend, is the real power in American politics at 
this day. I am glad to have its shelter, just now, when it is the most effi­
cient barrier to a new descent upon the South” 13
Democrats had some reason to be hopeful that Reed would not dis­
appoint them. Early in the campaign of 1888, he had joined with other 
leading Republicans in supporting a shift in traditional Republican cam­
paign strategy for the South. The new strategy had sought to downplay 
the “bloody shirt” rhetoric of past campaigns that recalled Republican 
sacrifices for the Civil War, abolition, and racial justice, and emphasized 
instead the benefits of Republican tariff reform for southern businesses. 
White southern Republicans had argued that the earlier strategy had 
alienated white voters, and had been ably exploited by Democrats who 
fanned white fears of a return to Reconstruction and “Negro Rule” 
under Republican leadership. A strong tariff and the promise of eco­
nomic development would, they argued, overcome the legacy of section­
alism and firmly unite businessmen in both the North and South for the 
first time since the Civil War. Reasoning that blacks would stay loyal to 
the party of Lincoln come what may, Reed, along with other prominent 
Republicans, had backed the candidacy of former Confederate general 
William Mahone for governor of Virginia.14
Mahone, a recent convert to the Republican party was eager to dis­
tance the party from its past and reconstitute it as one concerned solely 
with promoting the interests of southern industrialists and business 
owners. He had discouraged black candidates for political office, suc­
ceeded in removing a number of blacks from jobs inside the party's or­
ganization, and promoted the Republican protectionist, pro-business 
platform for its appeal to southern merchants and factory owners who 
had nothing in common, he said, with the Bourbon planter elites who 
controlled the Democratic party. His supporters were enthusiastic about 
Mahone's chances for victory.15 Republican congressman Leonidas 
Houk of Tennessee said, “Mahone's wonderful leadership in Virginia has 
brought 60,000 Confederate soldiers, men of character and intelligence, 
into the Republican ranks in that State.. . .  With all the questions grow­
ing out of the war removed, three out of five Democrats are with us.” 
Despite the protests of African-Americans in Virginia, Reed had been 
sufficiently impressed by these arguments to travel to Virginia and sup­
port Mahones bid for the governorship.16
On election day, however, Mahone lost his race by over 40,000 votes.
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It was a resounding defeat that sent shock waves through the Republican 
party. “We’ve been robbed ” said one Virginia Republican. In letters to 
the party leadership, others described how Democratic registrars had 
stricken the names of approximately 20,000 registered voters on the Sat­
urday before the election, and that an additional 25,000 Republican 
votes had not been counted.17 To Reed and fellow Republicans, the mes­
sage was clear. Free and fair elections were not possible under the cur­
rent system. Virginia, it turned out, was not alone. Evidence of corrup­
tion, fraud, and physical intimidation in Arkansas, South Carolina, West 
Virginia, Florida, and Alabama surfaced. In December 1889, eight blacks 
were lynched in Barnwell County, South Carolina, and hundreds of oth­
ers fled the state. In Florida, racial disturbances claimed the lives of sev­
eral African-Americans and a federal marshal.18
Under the federal law, the governor of each state certified the win­
ners of congressional elections, but defeated candidates had the right to 
appeal the governor’s decision to the House of Representatives. Shortly 
after the elections, appeals began to flood the House. In one case from 
Arkansas, the committee on elections learned about a visiting Republi­
can politician who had been attacked and killed by a mob before elec­
tion day. On election day in the same state, in a county which had a ma­
jority of black voters, masked men had stolen ballot boxes and a 
Republican supervisor was shot. Despite the evidence of crime, the gov­
ernor of Arkansas had certified the election of the Democratic candi­
date.19 In South Carolina, the committee also looked into a case where 
state officials had gerrymandered a district that stretched 200 miles, and 
included parts of nine counties in which African-American voters out­
numbered white voters five to one. The intention had clearly been to iso­
late large numbers of black voters in a single district so as to ensure the 
election of white Democrats in other counties. Reed commented bit­
terly, “When South Carolina, by a gerrymander which remains up to 
date the greatest spectacle that has ever been put on a map, and which to 
this day almost defies belief, put 31,000 colored people (voters) . . in 
one district with only 6,000 whites, the framers of the act meant at least 
that that district should have the Representatives of its choice. But en­
couraged by the success of the Southern plan elsewhere, even that dis­
trict has been taken away. It is well known that in the South itself, this 
was regarded as an outrage, but the voice of those so regarding it has 
fallen into the silence of consent.”20 He told a Pittsburgh audience the 
following April, “For the past eight years no man has heard me in the 
House or in the campaign discourse upon outrages or wrongs, murders,
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or shootings or hangings. But in recent elections, while physical intimi­
dation may have been less than in the days when the KKK freely ram­
paged through the South, ballot-box stuffing and cheating in the count 
have taken its place”21 Reed became convinced that the only remedy was 
a law that would provide federal control of the nation's elections.
While Reed's renewed commitment to the civil rights and voting 
rights of African-Americans may have been driven in part by partisan 
political concerns, it was consistent with ideas that had long distin­
guished him from many of his contemporaries. Reed was a firm believer 
that the Constitution guaranteed equal protection for all Americans, re­
gardless of race and gender. In 1884, well ahead of most members of the 
Congress, and indeed of his generation, Reed had endorsed a Constitu­
tional amendment to extend the suffrage to women. He ridiculed the ar­
guments of opponents who pretended that by denying women the re­
sponsibilities of full citizenship they sought only to protect women from 
the harsh and ugly realities of political life. Reed sarcastically compared 
these pretenses to arguments that southerners had once made about the 
positive good of slavery. For these people, “the good of the African was 
always the main object of slavery . . .  and it was their own good, not bad 
temper of their owners that was used to excuse severity of their treat­
ment.” The political equality of women was opposed “by reasons drawn 
almost entirely from a tender consideration for their own good.” “This 
anxiety,” Reed said, “would be an honor to human nature were it not an 
historical fact that the same sweet solicitude has been put up as a barrier 
against every progress which women have made since civilization 
began . . . We can better leave the sphere of women to the future than 
confine it in the chains of the past.. . .  Our government was founded on 
the rule of all, and all are invited to assist in governing ”22 Four years 
later, Reed, offended by the racist ferment against Chinese immigrants, 
had broken ranks with the leadership of his own party and voted against 
the Chinese Exclusion Bill. In 1890, however, the protection of African- 
American voters was paramount and, signaling his intention to make 
election reform a legislative priority, Reed appointed Massachusetts con­
gressman Henry Cabot Lodge to chair a special committee on elections. 
A friend of long standing, Lodge had campaigned hard for Reed's elec­
tion as Speaker. In turn, Reed entrusted Lodge with crafting a federal 
elections reform bill.
The Massachusetts Republican was keenly interested in the job. A 
member of Boston's cultural-intellectual aristocracy, he could trace his 
family lineage four or five generations back to the founding of the Mass­
achusetts Bay Colony. Lodge was also proud of the leading role Massa­
chusetts had played in the anti-slavery movement, and saw himself as a 
political descendent of John Quincy Adams and Charles Sumner. Like 
Reed, he was a party loyalist and fierce partisan, a believer in a strong na­
tional government, a protective tariff, and federal oversight of elections. 
“If it is important to protect American industries, it is vastly more im­
portant to protect American voters in their right to vote,” Lodge insisted. 
The legitimacy of the American form of government was at stake. “It is 
an oft-repeated truism that the purity ot the ballot lies at the very foun­
dation of our government, but it is not equally well understood that 
popular confidence in the verdict of the ballot-box is quite as important 
as the honesty of the verdict itself. At the present time, it is believed, 
rightly or wrongly, by large masses of the American people that there is 
no such thing as a fair election in certain parts of the country.” Congress, 
Lodge insisted, would be derelict in its duty if it failed to pass an effective 
election law.23 With Reed's urging, and aware that there was competing 
legislation being crafted by other House members, Lodge set to work in 
early January.
At the same time, Reed was readying himself for what would be the 
most significant and ultimately most celebrated battle of his political ca­
reer. Under the Constitution, the House of Representatives was required 
to act as the final tribunal for contested election cases. In January 1890, 
nine contested cases crowded the House's legislative docket. Reed knew 
that until they were cleared, the rest of the legislative agenda before the 
Fifty-first Congress would be stymied. The first case concerned election 
fraud and ballot box tampering in West Virginia and came from an 
African-American congressional candidate who had lost his election the 
previous November. Reed was well aware that Democrats would employ 
all means in their power to stall a final determination on this and other 
cases to prevent the certification and seating of Republican contestants. 
To do this, they would resort to a favorite and familiar tactic known as 
the “disappearing quorum” whereby the minority party could, under 
House rules, prevent any legislation it opposed from coming to a vote by 
demanding a roll call to determine if a quorum existed. When the roll 
was called, they would remain silent when their names were read. Since 
the rules required that a member's presence was determined by his voice 
vote, and since it required a majority of the whole to constitute a quo­
rum, the silent filibuster could effectively paralyze the legislative process 
and prevent the House from enacting any business.24 Reed acidly re­
ferred to the practice as “a system of metaphysics whereby a member
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could be present and absent at the same moment” He was determined to 
end it. If he failed, he knew that the Democrats would continue to use 
the disappearing quorum to obstruct any piece of legislation that the 
Republican majority proposed. Their own wafer-thin majority in the 
House, only three more than the number required to constitute quo­
rum, made the Republicans especially vulnerable to what Reed called 
"the tyranny of the minority” The fate of the Republican party's legisla­
tive agenda for the Fifty-first Congress, including tariff revision and fed­
eral control of elections, hung in the balance.
To Reed, however, the stakes were even higher. At risk was the per­
manent crippling of the legislative process in the United States, and the 
survival of representative democracy. He reasoned that if the Democrats 
could block the legislation that Republicans, who by winning the elec­
tion in 1888, could rightfully expect to enact, then they would effectively 
undermine the fundamental principles of a representative govern­
ment.25
On January 29, 1890, the House took up the West Virginia case. The 
vote stood at 161 in favor of seating the Republican candidate, two op­
posed and 165 Democrats defiantly denying quorum by sitting silent 
and refusing to vote. Without flinching, Reed began reading into the 
record the name of every Democrat he could see. Republicans ap­
plauded, Democrats howled, and pandemonium ensued. Reed remained 
steadfast, naming and counting. When one member protested, “I deny 
your right, Mr. Speaker, to count me present!” Reed paused and calmly 
responded, “the Chair is making a statement of fact that the gentleman is 
present. Does he deny it?”26 Democrats ran for the exits and hid under 
their desks. Reed ordered the doors locked and went on with his count. 
At the end, he announced, “the Chair rules that there is a quorum pres­
ent within the meaning of the Constitution.”27 The votes were recorded 
and counted and the Republicans had their victory. Shortly afterward, 
the House Rules Committee, chaired by the Speaker himself, reported 
out a new set of congressional rules. Known thereafter as “Reed's Rules,” 
they provide that all members must vote; that one hundred shall consti­
tute a quorum; that all present shall be counted; and that no dilatory 
motion shall be entertained. The definition of what was “dilatory” was to 
be left to the judgment of the Speaker.28 The new rules enhanced the 
power of the Speaker to streamline consideration of issues on the floor, 
and to appoint all the chairs of the standing committees.
The Republican press cheered. “Republicans make no mistake when 
they declare that a filibustering minority shall not clog the wheels of leg-
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islation. This is the people’s contest and Speaker Reed has the country 
behind him in his fearless stand for the right.”29
Democrats, though, cried foul and denounced Speaker Reed as a 
“cannibal autocrat,” “tyrant,” and “dictator” who had flagrantly abused 
the powers of his office. Portland’s Daily Eastern Argus railed, “Speaker 
Reed is playing the part of an enraged bull, madly rushing at the mata­
dor and trampling things generally underfoot as he goes. His arbitrary 
ruling that the Speaker has the power to count members as present, 
though they have not themselves voted on the roll-call is condemned by 
the highest parliamentary authorities . . . .  Dictator Reed’s plan of count­
ing in the opponents to carry legislative measures stands no chance of 
endorsement by the Supreme Court”30 A few days later, it opined, 
“What is Reedism? It is the one man power. It has the touch and taste of 
despotism.” 31
“Czar Reed” was the epithet most Democrats and their presses pre­
ferred. Political cartoonists had a field day depicting Reed crowned and 
sitting on a throne with a scepter for a gavel clutched in his fist. But par­
liamentarians around the world applauded Reed for his courage, and a 
few months later the Supreme Court upheld his ruling. The rules, 
known thereafter as “Reed’s Rules,” were Reed’s most lasting legacy. They 
have stood the test of time and remain in place today.
In 1890, the death of the “silent quorum” had immediate and practi­
cal consequences, for it cleared the way for orderly deliberations on the 
merits of the contested elections cases. Reed knew too that it also made 
likely the passage of much of the Republican agenda, including tariff re­
form, silver coinage, pensions for Civil War veterans, and, most impor­
tant, a federal elections bill.
On February 3, the House took up the contested case from West Vir­
ginia and, after weighing the evidence, voted to seat Republican con­
gressman Smith. On February 4, the Republican press in Maine de­
clared, “Justice Done,” and hailed the decision to seat the 
African-American congressman “legally elected by the people, whose 
election was stolen from him by the most bare-faced fraud.” The Bangor 
Whig and Courier editorial gave full credit to Reed for the outcome. “It 
was against this case that the Democrats sought to filibuster. Thanks to 
the courageous action of the Speaker [the Democrats] efforts to prevent 
its consideration have been futile.. . .  His demeanor under the impotent 
abuse of mouthing demagogues. . .  has been superb throughout. He has 
made the whole country his debtor in striking at the very vitals of the 
dragon of filibustering that has wasted millions of public money and
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"Reed as the Czar, 1890," Published in Judge. Reed’s political opponents decried his 
heavy-handed tactics. Political cartoonists often portrayed him as an overfed 
monarch quashing— or in this case “extinguishing”—-dissent. Reprinted in William 
A. Robinson, Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 
1930), 160.
been the most formidable enemy to legislation for the public interests. 
No State has ever had greater reason to be proud than has Maine to be 
proud today of the indomitable and intellectual power of the Speaker of 
the Fifty-first Congress.”32 With Republicans riding high, the time had 
come for broad federal elections legislation.
Lodge, whose committee had gathered testimony from a number of 
black and white Republicans, was ready with his bill. Others, including 
Senate Republicans, were prepared with proposals of their own. The 
Lodge Bill, reported out of committee in March, provided that one hun­
dred voters in a congressional district, or fifty in a county, could demand 
an investigation into alleged irregularities. It empowered federal courts 
to appoint bipartisan panels with two registrars and four inspectors, 
evenly divided between the two major parties. Federal judges were em­
powered to certify the winners of the elections.33
A much tougher bill, drafted by Albion Tourgee, a former federal 
judge, was introduced by Congressman Harrison Kelly of Kansas. It re­
quired that all congressional districts be nearly equal in population, and 
that district boundaries be drawn up by Congress rather than by the 
states. Finally, it required that the federal government supervise every as­
pect of the election process, from registration to certification.34
The Kelly-Tourgee Bill made the strongest initial impression on 
Reed. In a speech in April 1890, Reed reiterated several of its key points. 
“It seems to me that the only wise course is to take into Federal hands 
the Federal elections. Let us cut lose from the state elections, do our own 
registration, our own accounting and our own certification.” 35 Although 
the speech startled many in his own party, it served as a clear warning 
that Reed intended to use his powers as Speaker to enact a strong elec­
tion law. The New York Tribune editorialized, “It seems at the first glance 
an extreme statement, yet it is made by a political leader who has not 
been in the habit of denouncing election outrages in the South, nor of 
discussion of the race question in or out of season.”36
Reed followed up on the points made in his Pittsburgh speech with 
an article for the influential North American Review that implied that the 
Lodge Bill did not go far enough to ensure free and fair elections. “The 
[Lodge] Supervisor Law is the subject of objection,” he wrote, “because 
while it leaves the election in the hands of the States, it proposes to set 
watchers over the state officials, and to use a kind of dual control liable 
to all manner of friction.” Reed warned that it might incite “the very vio­
lence which they are striving to avoid.” And he warned, “It would be as­
suming a terrible responsibility to enact it.” Instead, Reed concluded, 
“Let the country at once assume at least the count and the returns of its 
own elections ”37 In a letter to Albion Tourgee he wrote, “I am not at all 
sure that we can get through an election law as you and I desire but there 
has been much improvement in the feeling on the subject and better 
ground for hope.” 38 Reed’s colleague, Maine senator William Frye, used 
even stronger language. This elections bill, he declared, “is not one-tenth 
part stringent enough ” Frye favored, if necessary, “putting a bayonet be­
hind every ballot” to ensure that every man’s vote was “counted as he 
casts it ”39
The idea of federally controlled elections, however, made little head­
way, and was further damaged when a Republican senator from Massa­
chusetts, George Frisbie Hoar, a leading advocate for election reform, 
submitted a bill to the Senate that called only for federal supervision, not 
control, of elections. Republican senator William Eaton Chandler from
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Pennsylvania, wrote to Reed indicating that he did not see support in the 
Senate to pass a stronger law. “While my desires favor a much broader 
law, than the extension of the Supervisor's law, yet I come down to the 
latter as the one which we shall all be likely to concur in the last.” Chan­
dler did, however, encourage Reed, and his colleagues in the House, to 
pursue a more radical solution. “I do not see why the House may not, if 
Republicans therein see fit to do so, pass a more radical law”40
In early June, Lodge submitted a bill that reflected an effort at com­
promise. It created procedures to re-qualify voters who had arbitrarily 
been stricken from registration lists, and, unlike the earlier Lodge Bill, it 
authorized the appointment of three supervisors, no more than two of 
whom could come from either political party. In addition, it authorized 
the appointment in each state of three canvassers, not more than two of 
whom could come from either political party. Federal judges would ap­
point these canvassers directly.41 Many Republicans sensed the limita­
tions of the bill, not the least of which was the concern that in the com­
ing elections, the reliance on federal judges appointed to office by the 
former Democratic President Grover Cleveland could compromise the 
bill's intent.
A number of southern white Republicans also opposed what they 
now called the “Force Bill,” predicting that it would “intensify race preju­
dice and engender sectional hostility”42 They were joined by Mug­
wumps, a group of mostly white, well-to-do Protestants in New Eng­
land, Pennsylvania, and New York. Once members of the Republican 
party, these influential northeastern elites had bolted the party in protest 
over the corruption of party politics during Reconstruction, and the Re­
publicans' reliance on “ignorant Negro voters” who they maintained 
were too easily manipulated by Southern elites at election time. By 1890, 
the Mugwumps were focused on civil service and tariff reform. They 
wanted nothing more to do with efforts to protect the voting rights of 
African-Americans and argued that the southern states should be al­
lowed to run their own elections. The Mugwump-controlled press, in­
cluding the New York Times, the Nationy and the Boston Globe, cam­
paigned vigorously against the Lodge Bill. The New York Times dismissed 
the bill with a headline, “What the Republicans Will Do To Keep in 
Power.” It predicted, “The Lodge Bill, if it was destined to become a law, 
would be a burden and an oppression. It would annoy the South, while it 
would make necessary an expenditure for which taxation would be im­
posed for party benefits. As there is little expectation that the bill will go 
further than the Senate, it may turn out to be merely a measure upon
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which they can go to their constituents to prove that they were in tavor 
of what they call, 'free and fair elections.’”43 The Boston Globe called the 
bill a “conspiracy” by House Speaker Reed and Congressman Lodge "to
stifle the minority and enforce Republican rule___Never has legislation
been carried on with such high-handed audacity” as it was in Congress 
under "dictator Reed.”44
Even as the debate inside and outside Washington grew hotter, the 
House caucus reported the Lodge Bill out of committee by a one-vote 
majority. Using his newly acquired power as Speaker, Reed quickly re­
ported the Lodge Bill to the full House and required that it come to a 
vote within a week. "To the applause of the colored delegation in the 
gallery,” and over the objections of every Democrat, the House accepted 
Reed’s stipulations.43 The stage was set for debate on the most impor­
tant civil rights legislation to come before Congress since the end of Re­
construction. It was to be unusually bitter.
Lodge opened the debate by asserting that his bill was not sectional 
or partisan in nature, and that its provisions would apply equally to all 
regions. He admitted that fraud still existed in Northern elections, but 
said that elections in the South presented a “far graver” problem. He had 
no desire, he said, “to indulge in recriminations about the race question 
in the South” because that issue was national, not sectional. "It is one in 
which we are all concerned and for the right solution of which we shall 
all be held responsible, whether we live in the North or the South . . . .  
The government which has made the black man a citizen of the United 
States is bound to protect him in all his rights as a citizen of the United 
States.”46
John Hemphill from South Carolina made the first rebuttal with 
language replete with the racist fury of southern redeemers. The Lodge 
Bill, he said, “would destroy the tranquil nature of race relations in the 
South by putting the colored man again in control of the Southern 
States.” Speaking on behalf of white southerners, he boldly proclaimed, 
"We know that we must either rule that country or leave it. Now, for my­
self, before the people of the United States, and before God . . . .  I swear 
we will not leave it.”47 Hemphill sponsored an amendment to the Lodge 
Bill which would have kept the power to certify elections in the hands of 
state governors. Alexander Stuart of Virginia decried the Lodge Bill as 
"hideous” and "appalling.” "Our government,” he said, “is no longer a 
government of the people, through their representatives, but a corrupt 
oligarchy working through its hirelings. I regard this bill as 
treasonable.”48
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Even support within the Republican party was divided. James G. 
Blaine, the powerful and influential Maine Republican who was serving 
as Secretary of State in the Harrison Administration saw little value in 
the bill. To him, economic interests and tariff reform were paramount. 
The “Negro question,” he said, was dead. He maintained that the only 
way for Republicans to build their strength was to forge ties with com­
mercial interests in the South and the West. Any effort to stress other is­
sues was political nonsense.49 On the other hand, there were southern 
Republicans who advocated a tougher bill, or no bill at all. Congressman 
Ewart of North Carolina called the Lodge Bill as “lame and impotent an 
effort to patch up a system of double jurisdiction, a system of legislation 
that has always been a failure and always will be a failure.” Any legisla­
tion, he said, should empower the federal government to “take entire 
control and supervision of national elections.”50 Others, however, in­
cluding Congressman Harrison Kelly, whose own much tougher bill had 
been side-lined, decided to support the Lodge Bill as a first step to more 
meaningful reform, “a step, even though it be a blunder, that will finally 
bring the crisis that will surely bring the remedy.”51 In a fiery speech, 
Kelly challenged assertions that, if passed, the law would never be en­
forced and warned of dire consequences if it were resisted. Any attempt 
“to nullify this bill if it becomes a law . . .  will surely bring on a conflict in 
this country.” War was possible, and if it came, “blood would flow and 
flow freely, but better rivers of it should flow and liberty survive than 
that the conditions that have existed in many places in the South for a 
quarter of a century should remain.”52
Reed agreed that the Lodge Bill would be hard to enforce in the 
South, and he worried that it did nothing to remedy corruption in state 
and local elections. But he concluded finally that it would be “very help­
ful” in states like Virginia and North Carolina in elections for national 
office. In his article in the North American Review, he made dear his be­
lief that the elections bill was key to the success of the Republicans’ 
larger agenda. White southerners, he wrote, “could control their state 
and municipal governments, for no power lodged in the federal govern­
ment can prevent i t . . . .  All we ask is that in national matters the major­
ity of voters in this country may rule.53 By “national matters,” Reed was 
referring to tariff legislation that he was keen to enact in the Fifty-first 
Congress and for which he needed a solid Republican majority. A sym­
pathetic editorial in the New York Herald made this point emphatically. 
“Speaker Reed is right. Let the Southern Democrats carry out their the­
ory of race domination if they will, in their own state and local politics,
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but when Congressmen are elected to represent the Nation and to vote 
on questions affecting the industries and welfare of the American peo­
ple, let there be a legal registry, honest counting of the ballots and a valid 
certification of the elections. It is simply intolerable that the economic 
policy of this Nation should be settled by members of Congress whose 
seats have been gained by systematic cheating conducted for the purpose 
of securing race domination in the South”54
Democrats in the House submitted last-minute amendments and at­
tempted a filibuster. But Reed enforced his rules against dilatory actions, 
and with his aid, Lodge marshaled the bill’s supporters. Shortly after 
9:00 on the evening of July 2, the Federal Election Bill passed the House 
by strict party vote, 155-149, with twenty-four abstentions. Only two 
Republicans broke ranks to vote with the opposition, a remarkable testa­
ment to Reed’s engineering and skill. African-Americans who had 
crowded the House galleries to witness the vote were elated. “For the Ne­
gro in the United States, the year 1890 is destined to be the most impor­
tant that elapsed since the Black man first touched . . . the ballot.”55 Re­
publicans, of course, cheered. The Bangor Whig and Courier hailed the 
vote as the climax of the most successful legislative season in decades. 
“The Republican House can point to a record of achievement, unsur­
passed . . . having under the leadership of Speaker Reed overthrown the 
entrenched abuses of legislative obstruction and successfully dealt with 
the great questions of tariff, silver coinage, pensions . . . and the enact­
ment, finally, of laws to protect the right of every American citizen to 
vote for the Representative of his choice.”56
Democrats and Mugwumps bristled. The New York Evening Post 
commented, “Speaker Reed has forced through the Federal Election Bill, 
as it has been expected that he would do ever since he had it made a cau­
cus measure.” But, the editors claimed, “While Reed is the House of Rep­
resentatives, happily, he is not yet the whole Congress.”57 The battle was 
on to win the bill’s passage in the Senate, and Reed was determined to 
use his influence. He urged speedy action on the bill before the fall elec­
tions and before momentum was lost. He wrote one Senate colleague, 
“We must pass the bill in the Senate soon or our defeat is certain.” Re­
publicans were hopeful. William McKinley wrote, “The Election Bill is 
now pending in the Senate, under which, when enacted, as it will be in 
the next session, every lawful citizen, rich or poor, native or foreign- 
born, white or black, will enjoy the right to cast one free ballot in public 
elections and to have that ballot duly counted.”58 Looming over them 
was a special state constitutional convention convened in Mississippi in
Thomas Brackett Reed 17
Rrr.i) vs m a s t  1 k o r  c o \< .r i  ss
“Reed as Master of Congress 'appeared in the Republican political humor 
magazine judge. Reprinted in William A. Robinson, Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentar­
ian (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co. 1930), 240.
August. The delegates to that convention, all but four of them white, had 
bluntly declared, “it was the purpose of the convention to restrict Negro 
suffrage.” The Mississippi law that emerged clearly sought to disenfran­
chise poor, illiterate blacks and circumvent any federal protection of the 
Fifteenth Amendment. It required that every voter be able to read or in­
terpret any section of the Mississippi Constitution in the presence of lo­
cal authorities before being able to cast his ballot. It also required that 
voters pay a yearly two-dollar poll tax and provide receipts from the pre­
vious two years as evidence ot payment.59 For African-American voters 
in Mississippi, the message was clear. Race discrimination had the new 
patina of state law. For Republican advocates of federal elections control 
in Congress, it prompted a new sense of urgency.
Democrats in the Senate, however, were determined to kill the Fed­
eral Election Bill. Senate rules still allowed all the old tactics of filibuster 
and delay, and without the kind of determined leadership that Reed had 
exercised in the House, the Senate’s business soon became bogged down 
in party bickering. Republicans, eager to pass both a tariff reform bill 
and the Federal Election Bill soon realized that they could not have both
before the fall elections. Senate Democrats, hoping to divide the Repub­
lican membership, indicated willingness to act on a tariff bill, if the Fed­
eral Election Bill was delayed until after the election. Southern newspa­
pers meanwhile played to the fears of Northern industrial interests, 
calling for a boycott of Northern products if the Lodge Bill passed.60 
Their strategy worked. Despite last minute efforts by President Harrison 
to speed up consideration of the Federal Election Bill, Senate Republi­
cans voted to take up the McKinley tariff bill and postpone considera­
tion of the Lodge Bill until after the fall election. It was a fateful decision.
With the economy in a downward spiral, labor unrest escalating, and 
farmers in open revolt against the power of eastern monopolies, the 
1890 elections were a disaster for the Republican party. Despite, or per­
haps because of the Republican majority's activism and success in the 
Fifty-first Congress, Republican candidates were soundly defeated. Reed 
won reelection in Maine, but Republicans lost elections in New England, 
the Midwest, and on the Plains where they had traditionally been strong. 
When the votes were counted, Reed had lost his Republican majority 
and with it the speakership. Republicans held onto only eighty-eight 
seats to the Democrats 235, and the Farmers' Alliance Peoples' party 
four.
Democrats had successfully exploited southerners' fears of the 
“Force Bill” and inflated their usual majorities in the South. They had 
also campaigned hard against Reed, the “tyranny” of his rules, and the 
activism of the Fifty-first Congress. Reed was bitter— bitter about the 
outcome and bitter about the verdict that voters had delivered. “Human 
nature seems incapable of prolonged virtue,” he said. “It is hard to keep 
people always up to the Republican program.”61
The Federal Election Bill was not yet dead, however. President Harri­
son and Republican advocates still hoped the Senate would enact a 
strong law. But a reinvigorated Democratic party was prepared to do 
battle. When Congress reconvened in January, Massachusetts Senator 
George Frisbie Hoar moved to consider the Federal Election Bill. De­
mocrats began to filibuster. When Republicans sought to close the de­
bate, Senate Democrats used the tactic that Reed had so soundly de­
stroyed in the House only months before. In the upper house, however, 
the Democrats were able to leave the Senate chamber, time and again, to 
prevent a quorum. Republican supporters of Hoar's bill tried repeatedly 
to bring it to a vote, but to no avail. African-Americans in Washington 
organized mass protests and lobbied Republican congressmen to keep 
up the fight. But as the days ticked by, interest waned and support in Re­
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publican circles dwindled. When a vote was finally taken, Republican 
senators from Colorado and Nevada joined with Democrats to defeat 
the Hoar Bill.
The struggle was finally over. With it died any sustained effort on the 
part of the Congress to protect the voting rights or other civil rights of 
African-Americans for another seventy years. One after another, each of 
the southern states, certain they would not face federal government in­
tervention, passed their own versions of the Mississippi law, and effec­
tively disenfranchised millions of African-Americans. In the decade that 
followed, instead of improved race relations that southern whites had 
assured if the Federal Election Bill was not forced down their throats, 
there was dramatic deterioration in all departments. The color line was 
drawn and ferociously enforced. Laws segregating all public facilities 
were enacted in every southern state, and lynching took a savage toll on 
black lives. Racism and vicious stereotypes became part of the nation s 
popular culture. For African-Americans, most of whom lived in the 
South, the willingness of northern politicians to accept defeat on the 
elections bill sent a clear and painful message. Their one-time friends in 
the North had abandoned them and turned their attention elsewhere. 
Lodge never again expressed interest in African-American civil rights. 
Instead, he focused his attentions on foreign affairs, immigration, and 
military preparedness. When the Republicans won control of the House 
again in 1896, Reed was again elected Speaker. He soon found himself 
out of step with the leadership of his party. Lodge, now senator from 
Massachusetts had joined with other leading Republicans, including Re­
publican president William McKinley and Navy secretary Theodore 
Roosevelt to press for a vigorous foreign policy that in 1898 took the na­
tion to war against Spain and annexed Hawaii. Reed opposed the war, 
the annexation of Hawaii, and the militarization of American foreign 
policy. In an article for the North American Review, “Empire Can Wait,” 
Reed decried the expansionists’ rush to imitate European imperialists 
and exert Americas control over people in distant lands. In making his 
argument, he invoked core principles that had motivated his support for 
the Federal Election Bill eight years earlier. To yield to the 
“earth-hunger” raging among Europeans would, he said, “be a complete 
departure from the maxims of the illustrious founders of the Repub­
lic.”62 Among those maxims, Reed declared, was the right of people to 
live under a government of their own choosing. It was the same right he 
had insisted on for African-Americans, and for American women as 
well, a right that was at the heart of American Constitution, and the es­
sential premise upon which the government was built. Reed resigned his 
office in 1899 rather than participate in the rush to empire and the con­
quest of the Philippines. He died three years later. Although he had lost 
some of the most important fights of his career, he was not a pessimistic 
man. He believed to the end that he had stood for progress and on the 
right side of history. In a speech at the Bowdoin centennial delivered not 
long before his death, Reed expressed what may be the most eloquent 
summary of his career.
“Justice, equality and the rights of man have an ever increasing sway. 
Whatever contribution any man makes to humanity and justice will not 
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